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Germany and the Eastern Partnership
Justyna Gotkowska
Germany perceives the Eastern Partnership as an initiative that is condu-
cive to German interests, but at the same time as one that could under-
mine them. Berlin would like the Eastern Partnership to be an instrument 
that brings the partner countries closer to the EU economically but not 
politically. Germany has opted for a tightening of the economic coopera-
tion with the partner countries, by signing deals on deep free trade areas 
and harmonising part of the legislation of these countries with the acquis 
communautaire. On the other hand, Germany does not want the Eastern 
Partnership to evolve and turn into an initiative that offers the partner 
countries prospects of membership and antagonises Russia. Therefore Ger-
many is trying to counteract any elements of the Eastern Partnership that 
would help it develop in the aforementioned direction. Moreover, Germany 
has set its own bilateral cooperation with partner countries in the east 
above the joint projects of the Eastern Partnership. In doing so, Berlin’s gu-
iding principle is that German money allocated for the projects on develop-
ment cooperation in the east should bring political and economic benefits 
first of all to Germany. 
The Eastern Partnership vis-a-vis German policy 
towards the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood
Germany’s position on the Eastern Partnership (EaP) is shaped by three factors:
1. Within the framework of the EaP, Germany’s priority is to tighten economic cooperation 
with the partner countries1. From the standpoint of Germany, these countries are attractive 
to German exporters and investors because of their prospects for economic growth and 
a growing domestic demand, the cheap labour force, geographic proximity, cultural bonds 
and the fact that German companies have broadened their knowledge of the region and its 
specific character2. Berlin has stepped up its activity in these countries which is signified by 
a dynamic growth of both German exports and investments3. 
2. From Germany’s standpoint, the EaP should not become a pre-accession instrument which 
would fuel membership expectations in the partner countries and their ‘advocates’ among the EU 
member states. Germany is stressing that this initiative should be perceived exclusively as part 
of the European Neighbourhood Policy and be bound by its confines. Berlin therefore objects to 
any declarations and actions within the EaP framework, which may emphasise the exceptiona-
lity of the partner countries in their relations with the EU and which could eventually become 
1 See statements by the 
representatives of the 
Committee on Eastern 
European Economic 
Relations, a German orga-
nisation that associates 
large, medium and small 
business, and co-creates 
the state policy towards 
Eastern Europe, the So-
uth Caucasus and Central 
Asia. Source: http://
www.ost-ausschuss.de/
ost-ausschuss-%C3%B-
6stliche-partnerschaft-
kommt-zum-richtigen-ze-
itpunkt
2 Germany’s economic 
relations with Eastern and 
Central European states, 
OSW Report, Warsaw, 
September 2008, 
pp. 4-12 (publication 
in Polish).
3 In 2006-2008 Germany 
noted a double figure per-
centage growth in exports 
to the countries included 
in the EaP. Even though 
2009 brought a conside-
rable decline connected 
with the global crisis, it is 
still unlikely to change the 
positive tendency. More-
over, Germany remains 
one of the main investors 
in the countries included 
in the EaP.
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an incentive for negotiations concerning their possible accession in the future. Ever since the 
EU enlargement of 2004, and especially that of 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania), Germany has 
suffered from enlargement fatigue – the political elite and society have grown increasingly tired 
of the enlargement process. Up to now, the issue of Eastern partner countries joining the EU 
has been treated as an open question, although put off till some indefinite time in the future. 
However, recent programmes and declarations by German Christian Democrats4 suggest that 
it is impossible to offer prospects of membership to all European neighbours and that 
the borders of the European Union should 
be marked out, while internal integration 
and implementation of the Treaty of Lis-
bon reforms should be prioritised. From 
Germany’s standpoint, the EU has grown 
less ‘steerable’ following the enlargement, 
while the accession of new members has 
weakened the hitherto leading tandem 
of Germany and France. Any further enlar-
gement (including Ukraine or Turkey) would significantly change the arrangement of influen-
ces in the EU, undermining Germany’s position. 
3. The stand taken by Germany comes down to the declaration that the EaP must 
not antagonise Moscow and jeopardise the strategic partnership between the EU and 
Russia, which is Berlin’s priority. Germany is still guided by the Russia first princi-
ple, although this approach is currently counterbalanced by Germany’s support for the 
EU’s greater economic involvement in the Eastern neighbourhood and bilateral activity 
in these countries. With regard to members of the EaP, Germany is opting for the ‘com-
mon neighbourhood’ model wherein the EU and Russia would cooperate and reconcile 
their economic interests – hence German diplomacy’s ‘trust-building’ measures with 
regard to Russia and regular reassuring declarations coming from politicians that the EaP 
is not designed as a rival project with regard to Russia5.
German support for the development of economic cooperation
Germany is opting for a tightening of bilateral economic cooperation between the EU and 
the EaP members, and for the development of instruments that would be conducive to the 
intensification of these relations. Among the issues supported by Germany are:
1. The bilateral dimension of the EaP, i.e. concluding new association agreements between the 
EU and partner countries, which include deals on Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas 
(DCFTA). Germany initiated6 the conclusion of such agreements by the EU in 2007. According 
to the German concept, these agreements provided for extension of the European legal fra-
mework to the partner countries not just in the sphere of foreign trade, but also in the sectors 
that were of greatest interest to Germany and the EU, namely the energy sector, environmental 
protection, transportation, and internal security. Association agreements and DCFTA as well 
as a harmonisation of the legislation of the partner countries with the acquis are in Berlin’s interest 
because of the structure of German exports and the specific features of German companies.
Germany exports medium and highly processed products (machinery, devices, chemical pro-
ducts, and ever more often technologies used in the energy sector and environmental pro-
tection). The structure of German exports is complementary to the economies of the partner 
countries in the east, who from the German point of view produce mostly semi-finished 
products, agricultural goods and groceries. Even though there has been no official German 
standpoint and no analyses published on how DCFTA could influence the German economy 
 
4 CDU distances itself from 
further EU enlargement, BEST 
OSW 11 (86), 18 March 2009 
(publication in Polish).
 
5 Before the EaP summit in 
Prague on 7 May 2009, Günter 
Gloser (SPD), the then Minister 
of State for European Affairs in 
the German Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, declared during the 
European Union Commission 
session in the Bundestag, 
that EaP is not a rival project 
towards Russian activity and 
is not designed to push Russia 
out of the region. For details see 
‘Eastern Partnership should not 
be a rival of Russia’ (Östli-
che Partnerschaft soll keine 
Konkurrenz zu Russland sein), 
European Union Commission 
session, hib-Meldung, 4 March 
2009.
6 This idea was included in the 
ENP+ concept, presented by 
the German presidency in the 
EU at the turn of 2006 and 
2007, although not supported 
in full by all the EU member 
states.
From Germany’s standpoint, the EaP 
should not become a pre-accession 
instrument which would fuel member-
ship expectations in the partner coun-
tries and their ‘advocates’ among the 
EU member states. 
i s s u e  3 2  |  0 4 . 0 1 . 2 0 1 0  |  c e N T R e  f O R  e A s T e R N  s T u d i e s
cOMMeNTARyOsw
3OSW.WAW.PL
(especially in the case of Ukraine), it seems that Germany would not rule out – as opposed 
to other EU member states – extending DCFTA to sectors such as agriculture and metallurgy. 
Moreover, Germany is even likely to support Ukrainian appeals to open the EU market to 
Ukrainian agricultural products because of extensive German investments in Ukrainian agri-
culture and its food industry, as well as prospects of increasing German exports of machinery, 
devices, agricultural technologies, seeds and plant preservatives. Furthermore, similarly to 
many other EU members, Germany is seeking to harmonise Ukrainian legislation and norms 
with European standards, amend legislation to improve the investment climate and to curb 
state interference with the economy. It also wishes to strengthen the institutions that are re-
sponsible for the implementation of the aforementioned tasks. Such changes would support 
small and medium-sized German enter-
prises, which are dominant in the exports 
sector and whose overseas activity is high-
ly dependent on the stability of conducting 
business activity and investments. 
2. Comprehensive Institution Building Programme (CIB7). A natural consequence of Germany’s 
support for the conclusion of association agreements and DCFTA and a harmonisation of the 
legislation, is its involvement in programmes of institutional development within the framework 
of the EaP8. These programmes are aimed at strengthening the institutions that are crucial for 
the successful implementation of the above mentioned agreements; they are to be put into ope-
ration in 2010. In all likelihood, they will be based on a twinning partnership of administrations 
of the EU members and the partner countries. So far, Germany has been the most active EU 
state involved in the implementation of twinning projects. Since 2009, German ministries and 
subordinate institutions on the federal level have been preparing for the distribution of funds 
allocated for these projects within the framework of the EaP9. From the German perspective, 
these EU projects are complementary to the bilateral instruments of German external economic 
policy since the twinning projects include the establishment of contact networks which are used 
for developing bilateral economic cooperation and supporting German export priorities.
Germany cautious about the elements of EaP 
with possible political implications
German diplomacy is being cautious about all those elements of the EaP that could have 
implications for the relations between the EU and the partner countries and for the relations 
with Russia, such as: 
1. The language of statements and documents concerning the EaP and the EU relations 
with the countries included in the initiative. Germany attaches great importance to purging 
the language used of any statements that could be referred to by these countries in their 
possible pursuit for EU membership. Germany was the leader of a group of EU states who 
raised numerous objections to the text of the Joint Declaration adopted during the EaP 
summit in Prague (7 May 2009). It was Germany who insisted on using the term ‘Eastern 
European Partners’ instead of ‘European states’, which was supposed to prevent these 
countries from referring to Article 49 of the Treaty of Lisbon. Germany also persisted in its 
objections to calling the new deepened bilateral agreements ‘the association agreements’ 
in order to avoid connotations of Europe Agreements (concluded with Eastern and Central 
European states in the 1990s)10. German diplomacy remains cautious about the langu-
age of the documents prepared within the bilateral and multilateral dimension of the EaP; 
e.g. it avoids terming relations with the partner countries ‘strategic’ and calling the harmo-
nisation of their legislation with the acquis an ‘integration process’.
 
 
7 The funds allocated for the 
implementation of CIB in 2010- 
-2013 amount to €175 million.
8 Germany appealed for alloca-
ting EU funds for programmes 
of this type during its presiden-
cy in the EU.
9 E.g. at the turn of 2009 and 
2010 the Federal Ministry 
of Food, Agriculture and 
Consumer Protection (BMELV) 
organised a series of seminars 
on how to use the possibilities 
offered by twinning projects, 
implemented with the members 
of the EaP.
10 Germany eventually gave its 
consent to the term ‘association 
agreement’ under pressure from 
the French presidency in the EU 
(second half of 2008). 
The French pointed out that 
a similar term had been used 
to describe agreements with the 
countries included in the Union 
for the Mediterranean.
Within the EaP framework Germany 
is interested in institution 
building programmes.
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2. Development of the visa dialogue with the countries included in the EaP. Germany is 
opting for a visa regime liberalisation, although it remains sceptical about the introduction of 
a visa free regime and maintains that the visa negotiations do not have to lead to that. Germa-
ny agreed to include the following statement in the Prague summit declaration: ‘The EU will 
take gradual steps towards full visa liberalisation as a long term goal for individual partner co-
untries’. Nevertheless, in the EU dialogue with the partner countries, German diplomacy tries 
to prevent the use of any statements that could suggest that this goal is feasible in the near 
future. Instead, Germany prefers to use terms like ‘long term’ and ‘gradual’. It also opposes the 
introduction of any ‘road maps’, which they perceive as the EU’s legal commitment to introdu-
ce a visa free regime, once the given country fulfils the criteria laid down by the EU.
Germany’s cautious stand on visa issues stems from its concerns that by lifting visa regimes 
the EU would fuel the partner countries’ expectations, and that such a decision would be in-
terpreted as a step towards full member-
ship. So far, the EU has applied a visa free 
regime in its relations with the countries 
who were offered EU membership pro-
spects (Western Balkans). Another factor 
that influences the German standpoint on 
this issue is the situation on its internal 
political scene. German public opinion 
and regional politicians are extremely cau-
tious about a liberalisation of the visa regime with Eastern European states; there is serious 
anxiety over a possible increase in illegal immigration, organised crime and an uncontrolled 
arrival of a cheap labour force from the east.
3. Cooperation within the multilateral dimension of the EaP. Apart from pushing through 
Russia’s participation in multilateral projects, Germany is not actively involved in the multi-
lateral dimension of the EaP, for three main reasons: 
Firstly, the multilateral projects of the EaP are much less significant for Germany which 
has a well developed bilateral system of political, economic and cultural cooperation11 
(see Appendices). Germany prefers to finance its own projects in the partner countries 
rather than transfer more funds to the EaP projects. Compared to multilateral projects, 
bilateral cooperation brings Germany many more political and economic benefits, such 
as contacts with state administrations, a deeper understanding of local systems of go-
vernance, expert assessments in selected areas, easier access to foreign markets for 
German companies through pilot programmes, and image-building. German bilateral de-
velopment cooperation is being carried out by federal and even regional ministries12. 
The areas of greatest interest to Germany include renewable energy and energy efficiency, 
support for small and medium-sized enterprises, agriculture, environmental protection, in-
ternal security and programmes that strengthen the rule of law and the judiciary. Germany 
also spends substantial resources on scholarships for students from the EaP member sta-
tes, and on promoting German culture, education and science abroad13. 
Secondly, the multilateral cooperation format within the EaP does not fit in with the German 
concept of a ‘common neighbourhood’ of the EU and Russia, wherein Russia and the EU 
are equal partners14. Even though the concept presented in 2007 by the German presidency 
of the EU stated that Germany supported regional cooperation between the EU and Eastern 
Europe and South Caucasus states, this cooperation – according to German intentions – 
was supposed to include Russia to the greatest extent possible15. As a result, a Black Sea 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 See the press release of the 
German Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs on 21 May 2010: 
‘Germany actively supports 
the process of drawing the 
Eastern neighbours closer to 
the European Union. Germany 
is involved in the Eastern 
Partnership projects and 
complements this activity 
by numerous bilateral projects 
in the sphere of politics, 
economy and culture’.
12 The projects are developed 
by the ministries themselves 
or implemented by German 
development cooperation 
organisations, specialised 
consultancy firms and NGOs.
13 Germany attaches increasing 
importance to the ‘foreign 
cultural and education policy’ 
and is constantly increasing 
the amount of funds from the 
federal budget spent on those 
needs (from 0.43% in 2006 
to 0.46% in 2008).
14 See the statement by Klaus 
Mangold, the chairman of 
the Committee on Eastern 
European Economic Relations: 
‘Russia is not sufficiently 
involved in the Eastern 
Partnership’. Source: http://
www.ost-ausschuss.de/ost-
ausschuss-%C3%B6stliche-
partnerschaft-kommt-zum-
richtigen-zeitpunkt
15 A quote from the ENP+ 
concept: ‘We are interested 
in Russia’s greater involve-
ment in the organic mo-
dernisation of the common 
neighbourhood with the EU’.
Germany is opting for a visa regime 
liberalisation, although it remains 
sceptical about the introduction 
of a visa free regime and maintains 
that the visa negotiations do not 
have to lead to that. 
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Synergy initiative was raised during the German presidency that was to encompass the 
countries surrounding the Black Sea16. Black Sea Synergy was designed as a ‘trust-building’ 
measure and a way of developing common projects in the EU-Russian neighbourhood. 
Initially, Germany even suggested merging the EaP with the Black Sea Synergy (which 
would mean Russia’s participation on equal terms with other countries from the initiative) 
and appealed for granting both the initiatives equal status. Currently, in mind of the difficul-
ties with projects within the Black Sea Synergy, Germany is pushing through Russia’s invo-
lvement in the initial phase of the projects 
implemented within multilateral platforms 
and flagship initiatives of the EaP.
Thirdly, Germany’s greater involvement 
in the multilateral format of the EaP could 
increase the significance of the whole initia-
tive and therefore invoke Russia’s negative 
reaction as well as encourage some of the 
EaP members to seek EU membership.
4. Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum. German NGOs, think tanks and foundations 
do not seem excessively interested in operating within the EaP, contrary to the Polish ones. 
The first Civil Society Forum in Brussels in November 2009 was attended by few German 
organisations (three17 out of 70 from the entire EU). This, however, does not mean that 
German organisations are not active in the east. They are quite numerously represented 
there, although engagement in tightening political relations between the partner countries 
and the EU has rather not been their priority. Most German organisations seem to share 
the view of the German government which supports bilateral involvement, the rule of law, 
democratisation and modernisation in those states, but not their political rapprochement 
with the EU.
Conclusions
1. Germany is not seeking to alter the nature of political relations between the EU and its 
Eastern neighbours – Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. 
Instead, Berlin is opting to keep the status quo, wherein the EaP is part of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy, which neither increases the chances of the partner countries for jo-
ining the EU, nor does it affect relations with Russia. Therefore, Germany is likely to block 
any increase of spending for the development of the EaP, to restrain the development of 
the visa dialogue and ignore multilateral cooperation within the framework of the EaP. 
2. Germany insists that the EaP should be an instrument that fosters economic integration 
between the partner countries and the EU. Therefore Germany supports tightening eco-
nomic cooperation with the partner countries and institutional development programs 
within the EaP, as well as within the German system of development cooperation. 
3. Prospects of implementing joint Polish-German initiatives and projects within the framework 
of the EaP seem therefore rather limited, although they cannot be ruled out in such spheres 
as support for civil society and trilateral projects with Russia’s participation. Germany is not 
likely to engage as intensively as France did in the Union for the Mediterranean, to avoid ra-
ising the significance of the EaP initiative.
16 The Black Sea Synergy 
encompasses all the countries 
included in the EaP 
(apart from Belarus) 
as well as Turkey and Russia.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 European Exchange located 
in Berlin, Heinrich Böll Foun-
dation (branch in Tbilisi) and 
Friedrich Naumann Founda-
tion for Freedom (Ukrainian 
branch).
Prospects of implementing joint 
Polish-German initiatives and pro-
jects within the framework of the 
EaP seem therefore rather limited, 
although they cannot be ruled out 
in such spheres as support for civil 
society and trilateral projects with 
Russia’s participation. 
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A p p e N d i c e s
1. Germany’s official development aid for the countries included in the EaP*
Recipient country Yearly average for 2007 and 2008 (million USD)
Germany's position on the list of multilateral 
and bilateral contributors of development aid 
Armenia 25 4 (after USA, IDA**, Japan)
Azerbaijan 29 4 (after IDA, USA, Turkey)
Belarus 20 1
Georgia 58 4 (after USA, IDA, EU)
Moldova 10 7 (after EU, IDA, IMF, USA, Sweden, Turkey)
Ukraine 74 3 (after EU, USA)
* Data quoted after the OECD, Aid Statistics, Recipient Aid Charts,  
http://www.oecd.org/countrylist/0,3349,en_2649_34447_25602317_1_1_1_1,00.html
** IDA – International Development Association is a part of the World Bank.
2. German development aid in Ukraine*
economic €134.5 million (total by year end 2009)
financial €104.5 million (total by year end 2009)
technical €30 million (total by year end 2009)
legal €310,000 (in 2009)
projects within the framework of the International 
Climate Initiative of the German government
€4.5 million (total by year end 2009)
projects supporting human rights €130,000 (in 2009)
scholarships granted 
by the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD)**
about 1,100 scholarships a year
* Data provided by Germany’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Laenderinformationen/Ukraine/Bilateral.html, accessed on 27 May 2010.
** It should be stressed that DAAD is not the only German organisation financed from the state budget, 
which offers scholarships to students from the countries included in the EaP. 
